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Article 36 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) enables third parties to
intervene in cases before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Access to justice is
a very important principle which has been developed both in international law and in the
context of the ECHR. There is, however, no clear answer regarding the question of how
legal aid is accessible for third persons who are affected by proceedings without being a
party to them. Taking the example of German law introducing Legal Aid for affected third
parties, the authors ask if such a national act is necessary from the perspective of the
access to justice. The law described here adds an additional national layer to inter-
nationalized proceedings and the authors seek to answer the question how helpful the
enacted law could be in practice. In light of recent controversies concerning permits for
major infrastructure projects in Germany the question of legal aid is also of importance for
corporate applicants before the European Court of Human Rights because affected third
persons who may be eligible for legal aid under the new law can also be those who had, in
Administrative Law courts, challenged permits issued to the person who then is the ap-
plicant in proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights. The authors also look
at the right to legal aid for affected third parties under the European Union’s Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the potential divergence between the Charter and the European
Convention of Human Rights against the backdrop of the potential accession of the Eur-
opean Union to the Convention and conclude that, notwithstanding some small short-
comings, the new law is necessary and should be sufficiently effective in assistance of
third persons intervening before the ECHR.
& 2016. Mykolas Romeris University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).“Legally enforceable rights and duties underpin a demo-
cratic society, and Access to justice is essential in order to
make these rights and duties real.”




Legal aid is often an essential element for the effective
protection of rights. This is particularly true in instances in
which the person who is in need of financial support finds
him- or herself already in a structurally weaker position
than the other party, for example in cases in which a ci-
tizen faces the government. It is due to this imbalance e.g.
in criminal cases that defendants are assigned an attorney
when they cannot afford one. But this idea also applies to
the financial support which is provided in civil or admin-
istrative law cases. What is often overlooked, though, is
that not only the parties to a legal dispute can be affectedier B.V. All rights reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-
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building permit, you have an interest in being protected
against construction noise and in maintaining the value of
your property. These interests can be affected significantly
by the outcome of this trial. In many cases the law foresees
some role for third persons who are not a party to the
dispute but are nevertheless affected by its outcome. Yet,
without being full parties to the legal proceedings in
question, they will often be unable to secure legal aid, even
if they are in need of financial support in order to ade-
quately defend their rights and interests.
In the opinion of the Council of Bars and Law Societies
of Europe (CCBE, 2010), the right to access legal aid must
“cover[…] the various parties within the proceedings”.
This could be explained as the including third persons
within the personal scope of the right to legal aid.
On the 25th of April 2013, the Law to introduce Legal
Aid for affected Third Persons in Proceedings before the
ECtHR or Gesetz zur Einführung von Kostenhilfe für Dritt-
betroffene in Verfahren vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für
Menschenrechte (EGMRKHG, 2013) entered into force in
Germany. This law also allows interveners to apply for
legal aid. This raises the question as to whether this law is
truly necessary in that it adds an additional national layer
to internationalized proceedings but also the issue how
helpful the proposed legal aid can be.
In order to answer this question, the law is to be
evaluated from an international perspective, more pre-
cisely, from the perspective of the ECHR (1950). Here, two
aspects are taken into account: the right to legal aid as a
right under the European Convention on Human Rights
and legal aid in cases before the European Court of Human
Rights. In addition, we will have a closer look at the
aforementioned German law before we assess its benefits
in the final part of this text.
The aim of our research is not only to familiarize the
reader with the need of affected third persons for legal aid
as a prerequisite for effective access to court, but also to
describe one possible solution in national law with which
the currently existing shortcomings in the legal aid
scheme provided by the ECtHR could be remedied at least
indirectly. Doing so also requires an in depth look at legal
aid in general. From the perspective of potential inter-
veners, here is hardly any information available with re-
gard to the support possible for intervenors before the
ECtHR and this text also aims at drawing attention to their
particular situation. This more descriptive part of the
current situation concerning legal aid is analyzed through
two lenses, the European as well as the national dimen-
sion. Doing so appears to be essential as the European
human rights system does not provide an adequate pro-
tection of intervening third persons, despite emphasizing
the importance of access to the court as a human right.1 See in detail (Harris et al, 2014, p. 480)2. Legal Aid in Europe
2.1. The right to legal aid under the ECHR and the EU charter
of fundamental rights
Legal aid by the ECHR is available to applicants (Raineyet al., 2014, p. 26), but apparently not to intervenors. The
right to legal aid is closely linked to the right to access to
justice. However, there is still a gap in the protection af-
forded by the ECHR. It could be argued that proceedings
under Article 34 ECHR are not covered by Article 6 ECHR
because they are not proceedings which are organized by
the state. Unlike the states which have ratified the ECHR,
the Council of Europe (CoE) is not a party to the ECHR and
hence is not directly bound to the ECHR when it comes to
the proceedings before the CoE’s ECtHR. However, the
proceedings before the ECtHR can be thought to be is of-
fered by the state by virtue of its ratification of the ECHR.
Therefore it can be argued that the applicant remains
under the jurisdiction of the respondent state within the
meaning of Article 1 ECHR when trying to access the
ECtHR. Accordingly there is still an obligation of the state
to enable access to the Court in Strasbourg. Such an ob-
ligation would be closely related to the spirit of Article 13
ECHR (which explicitly only refers to domestic legal re-
medies and not to the ECtHR). The question which follows
is whether the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR
provides for a similar obligation which would also cover
access to the ECtHR. Here there are two issues which must
be taken into account. In addition to the aforementioned
issue that the Court in Strasbourg is not a state’s court, the
applicability of Article 6 ECHR could be limited by the legal
nature of the proceedings. Article 6 ECHR only guarantees
a right to fair trial in criminal and civil law cases. The
absence of a right to a fair trial in public law proceedings is
one of the most important shortcomings of the ECHR.
Proceedings before the ECtHR may have their roots in a
range of different cases in domestic law, but even if one
wants to extend the states' obligation to provide access to
justice to applications under Article 34 ECHR and inter-
ventions under Article 36 ECHR it seems likely that such
cases would be excluded from Article 6 ECHR not only on
grounds of organization and operation of the court (by the
Council of Europe as opposed to the state party to the
Convention) but also due to the nature of the proceedings
in Strasbourg, be they under Article 34 or Article 33 ECHR.
A case can change from e.g. criminal to public law if an
appeal at the highest instance of criminal law courts is
followed by an application to a national constitutional
court. The legal nature of the procedure cannot be de-
pendent on the last domestic procedure as it cannot be a
consequence of the domestic legal system’s random (i.e.,
random from the perspective of the ECHR) answer to the
question if the respondent state’s domestic law allows for
constitutional complaints or not. Therefore there has to be
a universal answer to the question if the state's obligation
to provide access to justice in the form of access to the
ECtHR is covered by the material scope of Article 6 ECHR.
From the perspective of the ECHR, legal aid is relevant
in the context of the right to a fair trial under Article
6 ECHR. Article 6 (3) (c) ECHR provides for a right to legal
aid in criminal cases1 but not in private law cases.
Apart from that, though, the right to a fair trial does not
include an automatic obligation to provide legal aid (Reid,
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the concept of equality of arms between the parties to
legal proceedings (Leach, 2005, p. 257). Rather, the lack of
legal aid can result in a denial of the right to access to
court (Reid, 2007, p. 147), which is a key component of the
right to a fair hearing under Article 6 ECHR. While the
Court has been described as “reluctant to determine a right
to access to court when the applicant is refused legal aid”
(Grabenwarter, 2014, p. 127), this view has been ex-
emplified (Reid, 2007, p. 147) in Airey v. Ireland. On the
other hand legal aid might not even be enough to satisfy
the requirements of Article 6 ECHR (Reid, 2007, p. 148).
What is necessary is that there is an “opportunity to be
heard under the proper and effective control of the fair-
ness and conduct of the proceedings by the court” (Reid,
2007, p. 148). In any case is the provision of legal aid if not
always then at least often an important way in which
states can fulfill their obligations with regard to the right
to a fair trial.
The situation will become slightly more complicated
should the European Union become a party to the ECHR.
This possibility has been discussed for decades (Kuijer,
2011, p. 17) and has in recent years been given a legal
foundation both in European Union (EU) Law2 as well as in
the ECHR (article 59 para. 2). Also under the European
Union’s own Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000), the
right to a fair trial is protected. Indeed, at least as far as
criminal law cases are concerned, legal aid is essential for
the realization of the right to a fair trial (Gruodytė and
Kirchner, 2012, p. 80-81). But does Article 47 of the Charter
also require that legal aid is paid to affected third persons?
The Charter applies also to the implementation of EU Law
through domestic law (article 51 para. 1) and the ECtHR
has ruled in cases such as Bosphorus (Bosphorus Aisliner v
Ireland, 2005) or Kokkelvisserij (Kokkelvisserij U.A. v the
Netherlands) in which the Strasbourg court found the
implementation of EU Law by States to fall short of the
requirements of the Convention. A joint declaration by the
Presidents of the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice
(2011) aimed at securing the parallel interpretation of the
Convention and the Charter (Gruodytė & Kirchner, 2014, p.
73). If the EU becomes a party to the ECHR3 the court in
Strasbourg will be the ultimate guardian of human rights
also with regard to EU Law (Kuijer, 2011, p. 21). This raises
an important question because the wording of Article 47 of
the Charter goes beyond Article 6 ECHR. Unlike in the case
of Article 47 sentence 1 of the Charter, “[e]veryone“ within
the meaning of Article 47 sentences 2 and 3 of the Charter
can really mean everyone, not just those who are covered
by the first sentence of the norm. But who has a right to
legal aid under Article 47 sentence 4 of the Charter? It
appears from a cursory reading of the norm that this
would be everyone who is in need of access to justice. This
would not only be those who want to bring a case before a2 Article 6 para. 2 (Treaty on European Union as amended by the
Lisbon Treaty, 2012).
3 On this issue see in particular (European Court of Justice, (2014)
Case C-2/13; Lazowski and Wessel, 2015, p. 179-212; Johansen, 2015, p.
169-178; Krenn, 2015, p. 147-167; Peers, 2015, p. 213-222; Halberstam,
2015, p. 105-146).court but also affected third persons who are not parties to
proceedings. Keeping in mind the intended parallel inter-
pretation of the Charter and the Convention this might
require an interpretation of Article 6 ECHR which reaches
the standard secured by Article 47 of the Charter and
which thereby goes beyond the interpretation which is
common today. This can be problematic with respect to all
States which are parties to the ECHR but not members of
the European Union because they have never consented to
such a wide interpretation. This, however, appears not
necessary if the ECtHR reaches this interpretation not only
based on the political will of the European Union and the
Council of Europe or the presidents of the two courts but
rather by the traditional means of interpretation which
have long been employed by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights. These interpretative methods are those which
are also reflected in Articles 31 et seq. of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) and which have
been explained by the Court in detail in Golder v. United
Kingdom (1973). Under Article 47 of the Charter, a right to
legal aid for affected third parties already seems to exist
today and it is not inconceivable that the ECtHR might find
such a right also in Article 6 ECHR. However the factual
situation in selected EU member states regarding legal aid
is revealed in the next chapter.
2.2. Legal Aid in national legal systems
The beginning of the legal aid in Europe is usually seen in
the 17th and 18th centuries and the Age of Enlightenment,
when equality before the law and equal rights were codified
with an aim to create equal opportunities for individuals in
obtaining justice (Kiraly, 2010, p. 59). But in some European
countries the provision of legal aid to the poorest people can
already be dated back to the 15th century: for example in
England a 1495 statute by Henry VII abolished court fees for
poor civil litigants and the courts were given the right to
appoint lawyers to provide representation in a court without
compensation (Johnson, 1994, p. 204; Skinnider, 1999, p. 2).
Initially, legal aid was known as the law for the under-
privileged, aimed at ensuring possibility of participation in a
legal procedure for all individuals, not only for wealthy ones
(Kiraly, 2010, p. 57). Only in the 18th and 19th centuries, the
law for the underprivileged became a social duty of the state,
as most European countries laws provided court fee waivers
and appointments of lawyers for the very poor; usually this
was limited to the assistance concerning access to courts but
did not include substantial legal advice as such (Skinnider,
1999, p. 2). Broader schemes of legal aid were established by
states only after World War II (Regan, 1999-2000, p. 386) in
the context of a veritable “access to justice” movement
(Skinnider, 1999, p. 5), for example in the United Kingdom
with the establishment of a national Judicare legal aid
scheme in 1949. Judicare heralded an unprecedented em-
phasis on legal aid around the world (Fleming, 2007, p. 1).
Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
reformed their legal aid systems and established Judicare or
mixedmodel schemes that for the first time offered poor and
low-income citizens a comprehensive range of legal aid
services (Fleming, 2007, p. 1). Especially the schemes espe-
cially in the Scandinavian countries were considered to have
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aid started to decline in various countries. In the most gen-
erous countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden, legal
aid expenses were cut severely. Aid was tied more closely to
an increasing number of obligations with which the appli-
cants were burdened (usually requiring financial contribu-
tions), which resulted in limitations of both the actual pay-
ments and the services provided to litigants who were in
need of support (Fleming, 2007, p. 1). Today, the experience
on the domestic level is mixed and diverse: charitable sys-
tems, Judicare (for example in Poland),4 mixed models (for
example in the Netherlands (Ohm, 2009, p. 47)) and complex
mixed model schemes of legal aid services operate in dif-
ferent societies, orientated to the poor and disadvantaged
(Fleming, 2007, p. 26). The situation in national courts varies
considerably as far as the availability of legal aid is concerned
(Esposito, 2001, p. 10). Belgium, Latvia and France face pro-
blems with lawyer compensation and poor remuneration for
the legal aid services which are actually provided. For this
reason, some practitioners are not willing to participate in
provision of a legal aid (2012). In Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Finland and Greece no provision is made for an emergency
lawyer system even in criminal cases, which means that
usually first interrogations may be without a lawyer. In many
States (for example the Scandinavian nations or the United
Kingdom), various reforms are being undertaken in order to
reduce the costs of legal aid - which usually will mean less
protection for those seeking help. In other States, existing
rules are in practice inefficient as do not grant effective ac-
cess to justice (Esposito, 2001, p. 10). In the Czech Republic,
suspects in criminal proceedings cannot choose their lawyer
freely and if found guilty must compensate their legal aid
costs; in practice this means that in some cases the de-
fendant will waive the right to a defense lawyer because of
the financial burden involved (Fair Trials International, 2012,
p. 3). In some states the legal aid may be provided only with
the approval of the court, for example in Germany or Finland.
This procedure can also be time consuming (Fair Trials In-
ternational, 2012, p. 3). In Italy the process is very bureau-
cratic and requires various forms of documentation which
are related to the financial abilities of a suspect which usually
cannot be provided during the police custody stage (Fair Trial
International, 2012, p. 3). In other States, legal aid schemes
do not exist and have to be set up. In many states, there are
more or less serious economic problems which make the
establishment of such a scheme difficult. Finally, there are
States which have set up a legal aid system completely fi-
nanced by other States’ voluntary contributions (Esposito,
2001, p. 10).
Some EU countries make legal aid available to persons
taking complaints to Strasbourg. For example in the
Netherlands the Legal Aid Act allows legal aid for inter-
national human rights complaints, provided that the initial
body does not itself offer the possibility of legal aid pro-
vision (section 12(2)(f)) (Esposito, 2001, p. 10). In Norway,
Section 4 of the Free Legal Aid Act provides that, when4 Where a particular court is responsible both for determination of
eligibility for a legal aid and for legal aid compensation (Bojarski, 2009, p.
127).special reasons so require, legal aid may be granted before
a foreign court or a foreign administrative authority
(Butler, 2000, p. 365-366). The term “foreign” might be
interpreted as possibly including international bodies as
well. However, the majority of States do not include liti-
gation before the ECtHR in their domestic legal aid
schemes, whether criminal or civil. This includes i.a. Bel-
gium, the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Italy, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and Denmark (Butler, 2000, p.
365-366).
Despite the fact that the ECHR often requires states to
provide legal aid in domestic proceedings, it is still con-
sidered rare that the state (which often will also be the
respondent) will provide legal aid for proceedings before
the ECtHR (Leach, 2005, p. 26) even for applicants, let
alone intervenors. This comes as no surprise as the Council
of Europe, which runs the ECtHR, is itself not bound by the
Convention. The states which are parties to the Conven-
tion, though, might have to provide legal aid in the context
of the right to a fair trial. In addition to a number of states
which do provide legal aid, the ECtHR at times provides
limited legal aid (Leach, 2015, p. 26), covering e.g. travel
expenses to enable applicants to attend hearings in
Strasbourg (Leach, 2005, p. 26). The application to the
ECtHR for legal aid is only permissible after the case has
been communicated to the respondent state (Leach, 2005,
p. 26), which prevents unnecessary work for the Court in
case legal aid is requested in a case which is obviously
inadmissible. Legal aid to cover the expenses of the ap-
plication can then be paid retroactively (Leach, 2005, p.
27). In general, though, applicants will usually find it dif-
ficult to receive legal aid from their home states. Inter-
venors appear not to be taken into account by the Court,
nor by many states which are parties to the Convention.
Despite the progress made in national legal systems
“we are still a long way from an EU where every Member
State offers sufficient fundamental rights protections for
suspects and defendants” (Fair Trials International, 2012) so
we may presume that provision of legal aid in civil cases or
for intervenes might be even more problematic.
2.3. Access to justice and legal aid as human rights
Access to justice is one of the principles which can be
considered to have already rather developed to a high degree
on the national and international level but little attention had
been given to the connections between legal aid and human
rights until about 2005 (Fleming, 2007, p. 1). The responsibility
of states to provide legal assistance has been defined throughout
this past century on several different bases, including moral,
political, social-justice and legal term. (Skinnider, 1999, p. 2)
Currently there exists a range of international norms and
standards that are relevant to the question of a state’s re-
sponsibility to provide legal aid, such as International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1966), the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (1989), the United Nations
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (1990) (according to
which States should ensure finances for the legal aid of the
poor) and of course regional instruments, such as the ECHR
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR or Convention), the EU
Charter of Human Rights (EuChHR or Charter) etc. However,
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ensure that legal aid is provided (Skinnider, 1999, p. 11) and
these regimes do not proclaim legal aid as a civil or political right
(Fleming, 2007, p. 3). In opinion of the authors, after evalu-
ating the jurisprudence of the Court of Human Rights, States
should guarantee access to justice as a human right and not
just in the context of the rule of law (Gruodytė and Kirchner,
2012, p. 43). In 1970, the European Conference of Ministers
(1970) issued a declaration on legal aid and advice stating that
access to justice is an essential feature of any democratic so-
ciety and that its provision is an obligation of the community
as a whole.
If up until the end of the 20th century it was not always
clear for states what it means for states to have to guarantee
a fair trial within the meaning of the Article 6 of the ECHR,
the ECtHR has developed jurisprudence over the years which
addresses various issues. For example, individuals are en-
titled to legal assistance in order to guarantee the right to a
fair trial, “as providing for a general requirement of some
measure of “equality of arms” between the state and the in-
dividual or between the parties in the case” (Public Interest law
Institute, 2006, p. 2). Article 6 (3) (c) of the Convention re-
quires effective assistance of a lawyer which means that a
mere formal appointment is not sufficient. Meaningful access
to justice can only be realized if individuals have an effective
right in practice to enforce their legal rights and challenge
unlawful acts (Esposito, 2001, p. 10).
The European Union emphasizes the compliance of
member states with human rights obligations and the duty
to ensure access to justice in accordance with Articles 2, 6,
and 7, of the Treaty on the European Union and in the
Charter. The Legal Aid Directive (Directive 2003/8/EC)
adopted on 27 January 2003, furthermore, aimed to improve
access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing
minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such
disputes.
The establishment of legal aid represented the beginning
of a new stage in the relationship between law and society
and was thus fundamental to the development of an inclu-
sionary form of citizenship (Bean in Sommerland, 2004, p.
348). “Legal aid is an essential tool in ensuring access to
justice […] and [‘]it is the duty of states and governments to
guarantee organise and finance such legal-aid systems, which
permit those with the least means to obtain access to justice[’]”
(The Legal Aid Directive, 2003). This is particularly true in
instances in which the person who is in need of financial
support find him- or herself already in a structurally weaker
position than the other party, for example in cases inwhich a
citizen faces the government. Therefore in many cases the
law foresees some role for third persons which are not a
party to the dispute but which are nevertheless affected by
its outcome. Yet, without being full parties to the legal pro-
ceedings in question, these persons often are unable to se-
cure legal aid, even if they are in need of financial support in
order to adequately defend their rights and interests.5 The difference between Art. 36 ECHR (which refers to the President
of the Court) and Rule 44 para. 3 RoC (which refers to the President of the
Chamber) appears to be indicative of the transfer of competencies to
smaller organizational units within the Court.3. Interventions in the context of the ECHR
Article 36 para. 2 of the ECHR (1950) enables third
parties to intervene in cases before the ECtHR if givenpermission to do so:
“The President of the Court may, in the interest of the
proper administration of justice, invite any High Con-
tracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings or
any person concerned who is not the applicant to
submit written comments or take part in hearings.”
Like elsewhere in the Convention the term ‘person’ is
first to be understood as to include both natural and legal
persons. Legal persons in this context can also be legal
persons of a public law character (which usually could not
be able to be applicants in the context of Art. 34 ECHR),
including states (Leach, 2005, p. 55). The person in ques-
tion has to be ‘concerned’, hence a minimum connection to
the case is required, though this requirement is much
weaker than the victimhood requirement under Art. 34
ECHR. The real hurdle for would-be interveners is de-
scribed in the preceding words which require the inter-
vention to be “in the interest of the proper administration
of justice” (ECHR, 1950). Rule 44 of the Rules of Court of
the ECtHR (RoC, 2015) spells out the procedure in more
detail, Rule 44 para. 3 of the Rules of Court being con-
cerned with interventions by non-states. An intervention
is possible only after the application has been commu-
nicated to the respondent state. After the communication
of the application to the respondent, the President of the
Chamber5 decides whether to grant leave to or even to
invite non-applicants “to submit written comments or, in
exceptional cases, to take part in a hearing.” (Rule 44 para.
3 lit (a) RoC) The fact that the President of the Chamber
can both invite comments and grant leave to submit
comments indicates that would-be interveners can apply
for leave to submit comments. Such requests “must be
duly reasoned and submitted in writing” (Rule 44 para.
3 lit. (b) sentence 1 RoC) in English or French (Rule 44 para.
3 lit. (b) sentence 2, read together with Rule 34 para. 4 and
1 RoC). Unless another deadline has been set by the Pre-
sident of the Chamber (Rule 44 para. 3 lit. (b) sentence
2 RoC), the deadline to do so is twelve weeks after the
respondent state has been notified of the application ( Rule
44 para. 3 lit. (b) sentence 1 RoC) or, if the case is before
the Grand Chamber, since the parties have been notified of
the Chamber’s relinquishment of jurisdiction in favor of
the Grand Chamber (Rule 44 para. 4 lit. (a) RoC) or to ac-
cept a party’s request that the case is referred to the Grand
Chamber (Rule 44 para. 4 lit. (a) RoC). The President of the
Chamber may set another time-limit “for exceptional
reasons” (Rule 44 para. 3 lit. (b) sentence 2RoC) which
indicates that in theory a time-limit determined in such a
manner may be longer (Rule 44 para. 4 lit. (b) RoC) or
shorter (Rule 44 para. 5 sentence 1 RoC). In addition, the
President can establish additional conditions (Rule 44
para. 5 RoC), although it is notable that the Rules of Court
give the president a large degree of freedom in this regard
as the Rules of Court allow submissions to be taken into
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been met (Rule 44 para. 5 RoC). This, though, is in line with
the fact that interventions are meant to be in the interest
of justice, which means that intervener needs less of a
connection to the case than the victim.
Often, interveners will have a personal interest in the
outcome of the case but neither the Convention nor the
Rules of Court require them to. Yet, in many cases the in-
tervention may be almost as important for the intervener as
it may be for the applicant. One reason for this is that the
case before the ECtHR is between the applicant and a state or
states while the underlying reason for the case in Strasbourg
is found in a case before domestic courts which e.g. in private
law matters also concerned another party. This other party is
not a party to the proceedings in Strasbourg but might have
an equal interest in the outcome of the case as the ECtHR is
seen as a de facto (albeit not de jure) court of appeals. Like-
wise, family members might be interested in the outcome of
the case, e.g. children in child custody cases which concern
them but in which the legal question before the ECtHR
concerns the rights of a parent under the ECHR. In addition
to such concrete interests, other interventions have been
allowed based on more abstract or general interests (Leach,
2005, p. 57). In particular the interventions by human rights
NGOs (Leach, 2005, p. 58) have turned interventions for
practical purposes into amicus curiae briefs in the classical
sense of the term. It is the earlier category of cases, though,
in which a person might find him- or herself in a situation
not dissimilar from that of the applicant but might be unable
to afford the expenses associated with requesting leave to
submit, and with eventually submitting, an intervention.
But the problem is by no means related to human rights
law as it is commonly understood. In particular from a
German perspective, third party interventions can play a
crucial role in a regulatory context. In recent years, several
large scale business projects have been seriously delayed
due to legal action, in particular by persons claiming to be
affected negatively, would these projects go forward.
These issues affect not only infrastructure projects of na-
tional interest such as the deepening of the Elbe and
Weser rivers, the construction of a new airport in Berlin or
the renovation of the central railway station in Stuttgart
but also locally active businesses which are seen as dis-
turbing the status quo, such as large poultry farms, wind
energy and the like. Many of these cases will reach not
only the Federal Supreme Court for Administrative Law
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) but eventually also be brought
before the ECtHR. After all, despite the important focus on
human rights obligations of corporations,6 corporations,
too, can be applicants under Article 34 ECHR. In cases
before German administrative law courts, those who claim
a violation of their rights if a planned project were allowed
would bring a case against the public authority in question
and the corporation which wants to engage in the con-
troversial behavior would be a third party. If a corporation
were to claim human rights violations because German
courts had forbidden a planned project, the roles would
however be changed. The corporation would bring a case6 See for example (Hennings, 2009, p. 175).against Germany and those who had initiated the original
case would be affected third parties. Neighbors of a factory
the owner of which seeks a permit to increase the extent
of operations would be directly affected by the outcome of
that corporation’s case against the Federal Republic of
Germany before the ECtHR. They would be affected third
parties within the meaning of the new German law and
could now claim legal aid. Would German courts rule in
favor of the factory owner and the neighbor would bring a
case against Germany in Strasbourg, obviously the like-
lihood that the corporation would be in need of legal aid
would be significantly smaller. The change in the law now
increases the chance for non-corporate affected third
parties to be heard in proceedings at the ECtHR.
While this might at first sight be seen as another
measure directed against corporate interests, one needs to
ask oneself if this is in fact the case. Rather, granting legal
aid to affected third parties could follow the idea of the
equality of arms between parties to a legal dispute.
Equality of arms is an important aspect of the right to a fair
trial under Article 6 ECHR – but Article 6 ECHR goes fur-
ther than that (Delcourt v. Belgium, 1970; Isgro v. Italy,
1991; Janis, 2008, p. 792). What the norm requires is the
fairness of the entire proceedings (Vidal v. Belgium, 1992;
Delta v. France, 1990; Kirchner, 2013, p. 11) “as a whole”
(Vidal v. Belgium, 1992). While the ECtHR is not directly
bound by the Convention itself, States are. If Germany
decides to grant legal aid to affected third parties, doing so
must not destroy the equality of arms between the parties.
If legal aid is granted to affected third parties, they, too,
enter into the equation. Article 6 ECHR requires an overall
fairness of the proceedings and granting legal aid may not
result in a discrimination against others. By bringing af-
fected third parties into the proceedings, the impression
can be created that the applicant is now facing both the
respondent State and the third party. The third party
however is not a party to the legal proceedings at the
ECtHR. Rather, the role of the inclusion of affected third
parties into the proceedings is to safeguard their rights as
far as it is necessary. The primary obligation for the pro-
tection of rights however lies with the nation State. It is
the State which can have an obligation to limit the appli-
cant’s rights for the protection of the rights of others.
Ideally, the including of affected third parties in the pro-
ceedings would not be necessary because the respondent
State is already obliged to protect their rights, too. How-
ever, if third parties are involved, the overall fairness of the
proceedings must be protected and the applicant may not
find himself in a situation of structural weakness by de
facto dealing with two opponents.4. Legal aid for intervenors: Legislative developments
in Germany
Until recently, German law did not provide for legal aid
in such cases because the intervenor is not an applicant.
On 25 April 2013, the Law to introduce Legal Aid for af-
fected Third Persons in Proceedings before the ECtHR or
Gesetz zur Einführung von Kostenhilfe für Drittbetroffene in
Verfahren vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof für
7 The decision of the BfJ can be appealed (EGMRKHG, 2013, section
4 para. 1). The appeal is to be directed to the district court (Landgericht) of
the location in which the BfJ has its seat (EGMRKHG, 2013, section 41
para. 2). Currently, this is the Landgericht in Bonn.
8 Section 3 para. 2 (EGMRKHG, 2013) spells out potential restrictions
in more detail.
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lowing also intervenors to apply for legal aid. In Germany
what would be considered pro bono work elsewhere has
long been fairly well regulated. With the exception of a
few states in which legal advice is provided by specially
appointed lawyers who work in courts of first instance, the
standard model of legal aid consists of a client receiving a
document from the local court of first instance which
certifies that the client is impoverished with which the
client can choose an attorney who then will counsel the
client for no more than 10 Euros while being guaranteed a
minimum payment by the court. In principle, every attor-
ney participates in this system and an attorney can only
refuse handling such a case if he or she shows a lack of
specialized competence in the field in question. Essen-
tially, this form of enforced pro bono work is the price
attorneys pay for enjoying a monopoly when it comes to
providing legal services. In Germany, this monopoly has
been weakened in recent years and it remains to be seen
how long attorneys will uphold their part of the deal (al-
though it is hardly a deal if it imposed on attorneys by the
legislature) if the lawmakers continue to undermine this
basic understanding by allowing non-lawyers to provide
legal services. In principle, though, Germany has a working
system of legal aid which does not require an obligatory
insurance model as is used elsewhere, somewhat protects
attorneys against abuses and, arguably most importantly,
allows a relatively easy access to legal services for those
who otherwise could afford an attorney.
Now, legal aid is granted not only to the applicant but
also to the intervenor in a case before the ECtHR after the
application has been communicated to the Federal Re-
public of Germany (EGMRKHG, 2013, section 1 para. 1 No.
1). The timing indicates that German citizens or residents
who intervene in a case against another state which is a
party to the ECHR do not qualify for legal aid under the
EGMRKHG, although it remains to be seen whether this
restriction is compatible with European Union law and
Germany’s equality clause in Article 3 para. 1 of the Federal
Constitution, the Grundgesetz (GG). Also, the would-be
intervenor must have been invited (EGMRKHG, 2013,
section 1 para. 1 No. 2 lit. a)) or granted leave (EGMRKHG,
2013, section 1 para. 1 No. 2 lit. b) aa)) (or at least if such a
request appears likely to be successful (EGMRKHG, 2013,
section 1 para. 1 No. 2 lit. b) bb))) to intervene. Most no-
tably, in order to qualify for legal aid the intervenor has to
be unable to cover the procedural costs in full or in part
(EGMRKHG, 2013, section 1 para. 1 No. 3). Because the
ECtHR does not charge legal fees, the costs (a term which
in German law in this context would normally refer to
court fees as well as attorney’s fees) only include the fees
charged by the attorney in question. Section 1 EGMRKHG
regulates the procedure of applying for legal aid under the
new law in more detail.
It has to be noted that the new German law suffers
from a small flaw which indicates that the drafters are
more familiar with European human rights law as it exists
on paper rather than with the practice of European human
rights law: Section 1 para. 1 no. 2 lit. a) EGMRKHG, like the
ECHR but unlike the RoC, refers to the President of the
Court rather than the President of a Chamber. Rather thansticking strictly to the wording of Section 1 para. 1 no. 2 lit.
(a) EGMRKHG and denying legal aid in all cases in which
this decision is made by the President of a Chamber rather
than by the President of the Court, the drafters’ intent is
best served by interpreting the normwidely, i.e. beyond its
wording, as to including cases in which leave to intervene
has been granted by the President of a Chamber. The ap-
plicant is referred to in Section 2 para. 1 sentence
1 EGMRKHG as the “drittbetroffene[…] Person”, which can
be loosely translated as the “third affected person”. This
wording expressly avoids any terminology which might
refer to the person as a “party” to any proceedings, which
clarifies that the person in question is not a party to the
proceedings before the ECtHR. In other respects, the pro-
cedure to apply for legal aid is parallel to the established
rules under the Code of Civil Procedure or Zivilpro-
zessordnung (ZPO). In fact, Section 1 para. 2 sentence
1 EGMRKHG refers to a number of norms under the ZPO.
While normally it would be the court which deals with the
case decides on applications for legal aid, this task is not
imposed on the ECtHR but is given to the Bundesamt für
Justiz (BfJ), the Federal Agency for Justice (EGMRKHG,
2013, section 1 para. 2 sentence 2), a federal agency under
the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Justice.7 If legal
aid is granted, the applicant’s expenses including expenses
for legal representations will be paid from the federal
budget, (EGMRKHG, 2013, section 2 para. 1 sentence 1)
although there is no guarantee that all expenses will be
paid. Rather, Section 2 para. 1 sentence 1 EGMRKHG refers
to “eine Hilfe” (“an aid”), which might be less than the
complete expenses.8 Among the expenses which will be
covered are travel expenses and other necessary expenses
which are incurred by the applicant and his or her lawyer
(EGMRKHG, 2013, section 3 para. 1). This, too, indicates a
significant orientation towards the model presented by
domestic proceedings in which appearances in courts are
still normal. At the ECtHR, though, actual hearings are the
exception rather than the rule. In a sense, this transition to
written proceedings has already entered the legal culture
in Germany, too: in proceedings concerning constitutional
complaints before Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court,
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, hearings are highly excep-
tional, too. Also, in many cases judges at the Verwal-
tungsgerichte, courts of first instance for administrative
law, will ask parties for their consent to conduct pro-
ceedings exclusively in writing. Like elsewhere in German
legal aid law, the EGMRKHG stipulates that the legal aid
might have to be paid back in instalments (EGMRKHG,
2013, section 2 para. 2). If the proceedings advance to the
Grand Chamber, legal aid, once granted, will be continued
(EGMRKHG, 2013, section 2 para. 3).
With the entry into force of the EGMRKHG, Germany has
established a legal aid system for interveners in cases before
the ECtHR which very much mirrors the existing rules for
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account the particular situation of an intervenor before the
ECtHR in detail, the rules appear to be sufficiently effective to
assist those who need to intervene in proceedings before the
ECtHR. In enacting this law, despite some shortcomings, Ger-
many has contributed to a more effective protection of human
rights and has strengthened the relative position of the ECtHR.
In particular if one still has in mind the debate in Germany in
the context of the Görgülü case, this is awelcome development
which reinforces the commitment of Europe's second most
populous country to Human Rights and the Court. The legis-
lative change in Germany therefore was not only necessary but
it fills an important gap in the protection of human rights in
Europe and can provide a model for legislation in other states.5. Conclusions
Access to justice is one of the principles already rather
developed both in national and international law, however
little attention has been given to the connections between
legal aid and human rights until 2005.
Currently there exists a range of international norms
and standards that are relevant to the question of a state’s
responsibility to provide legal aid, such as International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, the United Nations Basic Principles
on the Role of Lawyers and regional instruments, such as
the ECHR and Fundamental Freedoms, the EU Charter of
Human Rights. However, these norms do not directly ad-
dress the question of how to ensure that legal aid is pro-
vided and these regimes do not proclaim legal aid as a civil
or political right.
The European Union emphasizes the compliance of
member states with human rights obligations and the duty
to ensure access to justice in accordance with Articles 2, 6,
and 7, of the Treaty on the European Union and in the
Charter. The Legal Aid Directive adopted on 27 January
2003, furthermore, aimed to improve access to justice in
cross-border disputes by establishing minimum common
rules relating to legal aid for such disputes.
Legal aid by the ECHR is available to applicants but
apparently not to intervenors. Article 6 of ECHR only
guarantees a right to fair trial in criminal and civil law
cases. The absence of a right to a fair trial in public law
proceedings is one of the most important shortcomings of
the ECHR. Apart from that, though, the right to a fair trial
does not include an automatic obligation to provide legal
aid, even though the right to a fair trial includes the con-
cept of equality of arms between the parties to legal pro-
ceedings. Rather, the lack of legal aid can result in a denial
of the right to access to court, which is a key component of
the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 ECHR.
Proceedings before the ECtHR may have their roots in a
range of different cases in domestic law, but even if one
wants to extend the states' obligation to provide access to
justice to applications under Article 34 ECHR and inter-
ventions under Article 36 ECHR it seems likely that such
cases would be excluded from Article 6 ECHR not only on
grounds of organization and operation of the court but
also due to the nature of the proceedings in Strasbourg, bethey under Article 34 or Article 33 ECHR.
Under Article 47 of the Charter, a right to legal aid for
affected third parties already seems to exist today and it is
not inconceivable that the ECtHR might find such a right
also in Article 6 ECHR.
Despite the fact that the Convention in many cases requires
states to provide legal aid in domestic proceedings, it is still
considered rare that the state (which often will also be the
respondent) will provide legal aid for proceedings before the
ECtHR even for applicants, let alone intervenors.
The provision of legal aid in civil cases for interveners is
even more problematic.
On the 25th of April 2013, the Law to introduce Legal
Aid for affected Third Persons in Proceedings before the
ECtHR entered into force in Germany, allowing also inter-
veners to apply for legal aid. Germany is going one step
further in protection of human rights. This law is really
timely and necessary and appears to be sufficiently effec-
tive to assist those who need to intervene in the pro-
ceedings before the ECtHR despite some small short-
comings. It contributes to a more effective protection of
human rights and strengthening the position of the ECtHR.References
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